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Abstract: After decades of slow incremental improvements, the United Nations Administrative 
Coordination Committee finally became the Chief Executive Board of the United Nations, which aims 
to develop further policy coherence within the UN system by promoting improved inter-agency coope-
ration. This high-level UN body opens up promising avenues. However, it also faces critical challenges 
to performing its task as a result of the strong pressures for regime-building within specialized UN 
agencies as well as a lack of coherence in policy formation at governmental level.
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Resumen: Tras décadas de lentas mejoras incrementales, el Comité de Coordinación Administra-
tiva de las Naciones Unidas ha sido transformado en la Junta Directiva de coordinación, con el objeto 
de asegurar la coherencia de políticas dentro del sistema de Naciones Unidas por medio de una cooper-
ación entre-agencias reforzada. Con este órgano de alto nivel se abren algunas prometedoras avenidas. 
Sin embargo, se enfrenta a desafíos críticos para desarrollar su tarea de modo efectivo, dadas las fuertes 
presiones a favor de la construcción de regímenes dentro de las agencias especializadas de Naciones 
Unidas así como la falta de coherencia en la formación de políticas a nivel gubernamental.
Palabras clave: Naciones Unidas, Junta Directiva de coordinación, coherencia de políticas, coor-
dinación.
Sumario: I. All together now?. II. The early experience. III. The new mechanics. IV. Current 
policy options.
I. All together now? 
1. During the nineteen nineties the United Nations introduced a programme of reforms designed
to adapt the original architecture of this global organization to the challenges of a new millennium1. One 
of the most significant initiatives in this reform was the coordination of policies, plans and programmes 
1 See Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform, Report of the Secretary-General, UN document A/51/950 
(14 July 1997). 
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within the system2, in order to avoid overlapping and duplicities.3 As a result, the United Nations created 
the Chief Executive Board for Coordination in 2001, based on its long-standing Administrative Coordi-
nation Committee (ACC).4 The aim in reinforcing this body was to further unity of purpose within the 
system, and upgrade coherence in global policy formation within the UN. Comprising 29 specialised 
bodies, the CEB is the main instrument for inter-agency coordination at inter-secretariat level. Manag-
ing the joint and regular work of the Executive Directors of the major agencies that make up the United 
Nations, the CEB’s role is to provide guidance on translating the various mandates of the different agen-
cies into joint programmes and activities. At the present time, the CEB operates as (1) a main forum for 
dialogue between Secretariats (at Executive Director Level), (2) the main instrument for coordinating 
substantive and administrative matters, liaising between United Nations bodies as well as providing (3) 
the main source of support for activating and implementing joint policies.
2. In practice, the CEB has no political power; this remains in the hands of the member states 
of the United Nations, through its different specialized agencies. In this context, deficient coordina-
tion of the various domestic agencies of any given member state (ministries of health, economy, 
environment culture, etc) transcends its administrative structures and is amplified by the international 
organizations in which the latter participate (WHO, WTO, IMF, World Bank, MEAs, UNESCO…).5 
In short, the problems of coherence arising within the United Nations system are due to a failure to 
coordinate the agencies of each Member state at domestic level; improving policy coherence in the 
United Nations depends to a great extent on improving policy coherence between the domestic agen-
cies of all Member states.
3. Nevertheless, the issue of inter-agency coordination has been a key policy issue for the UN 
from the very first, and was in fact incorporated in the UN Charter itself in the following manner: the 
ECOSOC has competence to (1) enter into agreements with any of the international organizations re-
ferred to in Article 57, defining the terms on which the agency concerned shall be brought into relation-
ship with the UN (Article 63.1) and to (2) ‘co-ordinate the activities of the specialized agencies through 
consultation with and recommendations to such agencies’ (Article 63.2). Thus, following the creation of 
the United Nations, the ECOSOC established the Administrative Coordination Committee, as a special-
ized sub-body entrusted with carrying out these duties (Resolution 13 (111) 1946).6 Presided over by 
the Secretary General, and formed by Executive Directors of the United Nations agencies, its original 
function was to increase cooperation among UN specialized agencies as well as to supervise implemen-
tation of the agreements between the United Nations and the institutions of the Bretton Woods system 
(the IMF, the World Bank, and the multilateral trade system); a particularly complex task as these bodies 
were and still are ‘legally, distant members of the UN family’.7 As a result, the work of the ACC over 
the last forty years of its history has been anything but easy.8 Umbricht summarized the committee’s 
position as follows: 
‘The chief value of the ACC has been, not so much to impose formal restrictions on the freedom of 
action of the specialized agencies, an objective which their separate charters and different membership 
2 J. Müller, ‘The Quiet Revolution, 1997 to 2002’, Reforming the United Nations: the challenge of working together 
(Martinus Nijhoff  2010), section B of chapter II.
3 e. luard, International Agencies: The emerging framework of interdependence (Macmillan 1977), at 269-270; J. tassin, 
‘Administrative Co-ordination in the United Nations Family’, International Administration (Martinus Hijhoff 1990), at 15-17 and 
t. beigbeber, The Internal Management of United Nations Organizations: The long quest for reform (Macmillan 1997), at 38-40.
4 M. Hill, The Administrative Committee on Coordination (1978) and W. Meng, ‘Article 60 marginal notes 13 et seq.’, The 
Charter of the United Nations, Ed. Bruno Simma (Oxford University Press 1995).
5 P. sZasZ, ‘The Complexification of the United Nations System’, 3 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (1999): 1-57.
6 l. aHMed, ‘The Organization and Methods of the United Nations’ Administrative Committee on Co-ordination’, 24 
International Review of Administrative Sciences (1958): 333-346. 
7 J. ruggie, ‘The United Nations and Globalization: Patterns and limits of Institutional Adaptation’, 9 Global Governance 
(2003): 301.
8 See The Role and Functioning of the ACC and its machinery. Report and recommendations, ACC Review Team, 
Raffeuddin Ahmed, Hans Blix , Franklin Thomas (22 March 2000), point 15, page 4. 
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make it difficult or impossible to attain, but to permit exchanges of views which have helped to promote 
co-operation and co-ordination among the agencies’.9
4. In essence, the Charter of the United Nations regulates inter-institutional coordination merely 
through consultation and recommendation mechanisms. Consequently, there have been serious ongoing 
problems of coordination. The need to improve these mechanisms has been a recurrent hot topic for the 
United Nations from the start. Given the decentralized nature of the UN system, collaboration in pursu-
ing common goals has been contingent on and, as such, dependent on the interests of each organization 
and their members. In this context, the actual machinery of coordination has also been semi-centralized, 
resulting in the creation of a wide variety of coordination mechanisms, aside from the ACC. In fact, 
a report by the Secretary General from the mid nineteen eighties identified 91 ‘formal coordination 
mechanisms’ within the United Nations system with only 20 of these being ACC mechanisms.10 Given 
this state of affairs, and taking into account the diverse mandates and governing bodies of the participat-
ing organizations, it is reasonable to argue that providing them with a common goal posed a challenge 
that is anything but simple.11 
II. The early experience
5. The machinery of coordination within the United Nations has been subject to constant re-
structuring throughout its half century of existence.  The original absence of a central authority to ensure 
coherent policy action within the system has been −and still is− an ongoing problem for the United 
Nations. The need for greater coordination has been patent from the start. In this regard, the ACC has 
been psychoanalysed ad infinitum, with multiple studies published on its functions, operations and the 
efficiency of its subsidiary machinery: from 1953 to 1981, for example, 32 diagnostic reports were is-
sued on the subject. Every decade has produced a significant review: the first was in 1977, resulting 
from the Resolution 32/197 of 20 December 1977; the second in 1985, pursuant to Resolution 40/177 of 
December 1985; and the third between 1992 and 1993, following adoption of the Reform report issued 
by Francis Blanchard, the Director General of the ILO.12 As mentioned, it was not until the final review 
in 2001 that the ACC was transformed to become the CEB.
6. The reform deriving from the Blanchard Report is probably the most important of all, apart 
from that which gave rise to the CEB. In this reform, the General Secretary finally managed to shift the 
ACC focus, originally concerned with administrative coordination, to coordination of public policies.13 
Therefore, Blanchard’s planned reform made a qualitative breakthrough, beginning to focus on policy 
coordination, without abandoning the traditional functions of administrative coordination.14 In the early 
nineties, the ACC was defined in the following way: 
‘A committee of executive heads who have been entrusted by (their) governing bodies... with im-
plementing the policies determined by those bodies and carrying out programmes approved by them’.15
7. The reform from the early 90s produced organizational changes associated with this new di-
rection taken by the ACC, thus facilitating the subsequent creation of the CEB. The most significant or-
ganizational change in this regard was the concentration of competence on programme (CCSQ/PROG) 
and operation (CCSQ/OPS) in a single ACC body: the Consultative Committee on Programmes and 
9 V. uMbricHt, ‘Joint Activities of International Organizations’, Manuel sur les organisations internationals (Martinus Nij-
hoff Publishers 1988), at 377.
10 See UN documents A/42/232 and E/1987/68 (22 May 1987), at 17.
11 e. bardacH, Getting Agencies to Work Together (Brookings Institution 1998).
12 See ACC/1992/CRP.7/Rev 1 and ACC/1993/CRP.1 (29 March 1993).
13 See ACC/1992/2/Add.l (10 June 1992).
14 See ACC/1993/14 (14 July 1993). 
15 See ACC/1993/14, 14 July 1993.
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Operational Questions (CCPOQ).16  In short, the incremental reforms implemented in the ACC gave rise 
to the basic profiles of the current CEB. 
8. Interestingly, the impetus behind the creation of the CEB was actually a year earlier than 
the United Nations reform programme promoted by Kofi Annan (1997).17 In fact, in the ACC work-
ing sessions in 1996 (25 and 26 October 1996),18 the Executive Directors had already prepared a Joint 
Statement on reform efforts to date, and on the future direction of these processes in the United Nations 
system (11 November 1996).19 This joint Statement considered measures for reform and emphasized the 
need for every agency in the United Nations system to concentrate on their basic area of competence, 
while at the same time reinforcing their joint actions.20
9. ACC members were aware of the challenges inherent in coordinating in an interdependent 
world in which, paradoxically, public action is highly fragmented; inevitably, as a result of this structural 
fragmentation and divisions, to paraphrase Koskenniemi, ‘the sphere of the “international” has been 
transformed from one of a principled commitment to a battle-zone’.21
10. From the mid nineteen nineties, the ACC’s Executive directors with the Secretary General 
at their head began giving some credence to the role that this body could play in responding collectively 
to the challenges of globalization.22 On this point, the Secretary General’s efforts to strengthen coordi-
nation by creating the CEB were a determining factor. The creation of this body is probably one of the 
least known achievements of Kofi Annan during his period in office. At the end of the nineties, we find 
the then Secretary General explaining to the executive directors the need to reinforce and transform 
the committee’s consultation system as well as inventing mechanisms which will ensure ongoing com-
munication and dialogue between its members. For Kofi Annan, new working methods were needed in 
the subsidiary machinery of the committee and full time support for the team in the Secretariat. In fact, 
Annan began by creating the Office of Inter-Agency Affairs in 1998 to ensure improved interchange of 
information between members of the ACC.23
11. In the heat of the globalization debates of the nineties, the committee members shared the 
Secretary General’s vision on the potential role of the ACC in the global institutional architecture and 
undertook to transform it into the centrepiece of a more united and effective system.24 The Secretary 
General addressed members of the ACC on 5 October 1999 as follows: 
‘Best way to proceed is to entrust the task of reviewing the current state of affairs and of preparing 
a proposed blueprint of desirable reforms to a small and independent team that combines in-depth, direct 
experience of the workings of the inter-agency machinery, with an external but knowledgeable view.’ 
12. Reasonably, the improved effectiveness of the United Nations requires increased coher-
ence, not only in the phase of formulating policies but also in implementing them. Only in this way 
will the United Nations be able to increase their capacity to provide a coherent collective response to 
16 See ACC/1992/32 (28 July 1993) at 7.
17 See Res A/51/950, Renewing the United Nations: A programme for Reform, Secretary General’s Report (14 July 1997).
18 See Joint Statement on Reform Processes in United Nations System Issued by Administrative Committee on Coordination, 
Press Release SG/SM/6106 ORG 1227 (11 November 1996). 
19 See Reform and Strengthening of the United Nations System, SG/SM/6106/0RG/l227 (11 September 1996).
20 See ACC/1996/20 (3 December 1996), pp.17-18 and ANNEX III The Role and Functioning of ACC:  An historical note, 
paragraph 33.
21 M. KosKennieMi, International Legislation: today’s limits and possibilities, op.cit.p.31.
22 See Summary of conclusions of the Administrative Committee on Coordination at its first regular session of 2000, 
ACC/2000/4 (7 June 2000).
23 See Summary of conclusions of the Administrative Committee on Coordination at its first regular session of 1998, 
ACC/1998/4 (9 June 1998), paragraphs 20-21, y Managing Risks of Globalization Great Challenge of Modern Times, Secretary-
General Tells Economic and Social Council, Press Release ECOSOC /5812 (3 February 1999).
24 See Summary …op.cit, paragraph 20 (“centrepiece of a more united and effective system”). 
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major global public matters. The United Nation’s reform programme was very clear on this point.25 In 
the late nineteen nineties, the tasks considered by Executive Directors to be essential for improving co-
ordination already included initiatives such as the creation of strategic alliances between agencies and 
consulting mechanisms which would ensure respect for the mandates and capacities of each agency, as 
well as clarifying the functions of the latter.26 The ground breaking 1998 Operations Plan −drawn up on 
the basis of the Secretary General’s proposals− had already incorporated in its agenda structural issues 
such as the relation between mandates and the implications of this relation for operation of the United 
Nations system overall:   
‘Bringing about greater policy coherence and functional complementarily at the level of the system, 
strengthening the system’s collective capacity for forward planning and strategic thinking, formulation 
of complementary responses to global problems and strategies for resource mobilization, enhancing the 
system’s flexibility and rapid response capacity to major international developments and crises’.27
13. Given this scenario, the ACC 1999 annual report declared in straightforward terms: ‘a new 
phase in inter-agency cooperation, spurred by the imperatives of globalization, is now emerging’.28 Dur-
ing this period, several key ideas and proposals arose. Notable among these was the policy document 
issued by Gert Rosenthal, former Executive Secretary of the CEPAL.29 In his document A system-wide 
reform, Rosenthal defended institutionalization of a culture of inter-institutional dialogue and commu-
nication in order to connect the theory and practice of coordination in all the structural activities of the 
United Nations (proposals, initiatives,  programme priorities, strategic plans etc). In short, during the 
years prior to creation of the CEB, some Executive Directors and committee personnel were striving to 
take advantage of the UN reform programme in order to substantially improve inter-institutional coordi-
nation. This small epistemic community considered that improvement of this kind could help the United 
Nations to address global governance in a coherent and effective manner: 
‘As the United Nations system enters a new century and equips itself to address the challenges of 
globalization, the content and purpose of inter-agency coordination is taking on a new policy significan-
ce, and a new central place in the policy concerns and initiatives of the organizations constituting the 
system’.30
14. The report, drawn up by the ACC review team in 2000 and entitled The Role and function-
ing of the ACC and its machinery, 31is a clear expression of this principle. The basic ideas of this team 
comprising Hans Blix, former Director General of the IAEA, Raffeuddin Ahmed, Head of the Economic 
Department and Franklin Thomas, former president of the Ford Foundation were summarized thus:
‘While substantive policy making is the prerogative of member states, ACC could focus its dialo-
gues and deliberations in such a manner as to provide clear guidance for translating legislative mandates 
into joint programmes and activities. Where initiatives of a policy nature appear urgent, ACC may agree 
to draw them to the attention of the relevant policy-making organs of the system’.32 
15. In short, the ACC review team placed on the table the need to provide the coordination ma-
chinery with two basic functions for adopting coherent decisions: 
25 See Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform, A/5l/950 (14 July 1997). 
26 See Summary of conclusions of the Administrative Committee on Coordination at its first regular session of 1998, 
paragraph 18. 
27 See Summary (1998)…op.cit, paragraphs 20, 21, 23 and 24 (paragraph 22). 
28 See UN Doc. E/2000/53, Annual Review report of the Administrative Committee on Coordination, 1999,  (7 May 2000), 
paragraph 3.
29 See System-wide Reform: An appraisal of the current phase (1998).
30 See Summary of conclusions of the Administrative Committee on Coordination at its first regular session of 2000, 
ACC/2000/4 (7 June 2000).
31 See in particular, Review of the Administrative Committee on Coordination and its Machinery: Report of the Joint 
Inspection Unit of the ACC and its Machinery, A/54/288 (30 August 1999).
32 See The Role and Functioning of ACC, op.cit. paragraph 19.4, p.7.
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1.   The concurrent mandates of the different agencies in the United Nations require the ACC to 
be attributed the authority to provide guidance on joint programmes and activities.
2.    The ACC’s nodal position in the United Nations system also requires that it has competence 
to propose urgent policies.
16. Blix, Ahmed and Thomas proposed to make the ACC formally responsible for guiding pro-
grammes and activities as well as proposals for urgent policies. Interestingly, they also recommend-
ed modifying the name “ACC” so that its policy-related functions were more accurately expressed.33 
Clearly, their work lays down the foundations for the CEB, offering pragmatic and reasonable ideas for 
facilitating change.  
III. The new mechanics
17. Achieving a unified purpose for the many institutions that make up the United Nations is no 
easy task. The ACC became a Board of Management of the United Nations in 2001 with such aim in 
mind.34 The new reorganized body was granted the authority to promote more integrated and systematic 
programmes and therefore increase the degree of coherence of the United Nations system overall.35 
The transformation of the ACC to CEB was logically a basic element of the United Nations reform, 
promoted during Kofi Annan’s mandate.36 Currently, the Executive Directors of the CEB openly deal 
with issues of joint policies and strategies, and actively address ways of increasing coherence among its 
institutions. The change of paradigm at executive level has already occurred. In fact, there is consensus 
on the need to continue developing in this direction. 
18. However, this requires inoculating the idea of “system” at all levels, beginning with the 
executive offices, and continuing with governments. On this point, the first decade of the new millen-
nium is producing some changes. The first of these innovations was an initiative launched during the 
World Summit of 2005 to make the United Nations system more coherent and effective in matters of 
development cooperation.37 For this purpose, in February 2006 the Secretary General created the High-
level Panel on UN System-wide Coherence, following the document detailing the results of the World 
Summit, paragraph 169 of which prescribed that decision making throughout United Nations should 
take into consideration ‘main horizontal policy themes’.
19. The objective of the Panel was to carry out an in-depth analysis of the solutions avail-
able for further strengthening coordination of United Nations operational activities with regard to the 
achievement of the internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development 
Goals. That same year, in November, the Panel presented its report ‘Delivering as One’ (A/61/583). 
From then on, following two years of consultations, the General Assembly was to adopt the first and 
second Resolution on UN system-wide coherence, on 15 September 2008 (A/RES/62/277) and 2 Octo-
ber 2009 (A/RES/63/311), respectively. The first of these resolutions provided the initiative structure; 
and the second reinforced inter-institutional cooperation in 5 prioritised areas linked to development: 
(1) women’s empowerment (2) strengthening UN coordination with regard to development govern-
ance, (3) improving UN funding for development, (4) delivering as one and (5) harmonisation of busi-
ness practices.
33 See The Role and Functioning of ACC,op.cit. paragraph 20.9, p.ll. 
34 r. Mclaren, ‘UN Reform through Coordination by the ACC: The Continuing Saga of the King and the Barons’, 67 
International Review of Administrative Sciences2 (2001): 313-322.
35 See Summary of conclusions of the Administrative Committee on Coordination at its first regular session of 1998, 
paragraphs 13 and 14. 
36 See Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform, A/5l/950 (14 July 1997). 
37 See J. Müller, ‘System-Wide Coherence of UN Operational Activities’, Reforming the United Nations: the challenge of 
working together (Martinus Nijhoff 2010), section D of chapter III.
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20. These new initiatives are instrumental to the CEB’s work, which since the start has included 
coordination of elements of the Millennium goals programme as one of its tasks; as is known, the first 
global programme of public policies based on measurable goals and employing measurement mecha-
nisms for ensuring quantifiable fulfilment.38 As a result, the CEB today is defined as the main instrument 
for supporting and reinforcing the function of coordination of United Nations inter-governmental bod-
ies in social, economic and related matters. Led by the Secretary General and aided by the Secretariat 
−based in both Geneva and New York− the new body promotes coordination and strategic direction in 
the areas of responsibility of the Executive Directors.  
21. There are currently three basic bodies for achieving this. The first of these and the most 
important is the CEB High Level Committee on Programmes (HLCP), responsible for promoting coher-
ence and cooperation as well as sharing knowledge in strategic areas within the system. In addition, the 
CEB High Level Committee on Management (HLCM) undertakes to identify and analyse administrative 
reforms for improving efficiency and for simplifying what is currently known as United Nations ‘busi-
ness practices’. Finally, the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) is responsible for coordinat-
ing operational activities at a domestic level. Its mandate on this point is based on wide quadrennial 
policy review of the operational activities for development of the United Nations system.39 These three 
bodies meet twice a year prior to the CEB sessions. They provide direction and guidance to networks 
and established working groups. Their agendas concentrate on promoting harmonization of specific 
practices, as well as emerging issues which require policy coherence. 
22. The CEB concentrates its efforts on promoting what it calls ‘a holistic approach to all is-
sues of system-wide importance’. Hence, its tasks have varied considerably from those of the old ACC, 
including among others the following tasks and activities: (1) coordinated United Nations approach to 
climate change, (2) implementation of joint initiatives in response to the global and economic financial 
crisis, (3) progress for harmonization and simplification of business practices of the United Nations, (4) 
improved security of system personnel at a global scale, etc.40 Through the CEB, the United Nations 
‘are committed to responding to these challenges by delivering as one at the global, regional and coun-
try levels on the basis of their convening and advocacy roles, normative and analytical expertise, and 
operational and coordination capabilities’. 
23. With regard to climate change, the CEB provides the impetus for various initiatives designed 
to ensure that the United Nations is able to deliver as one in matters of mitigation and adaptation. The 
CEB also monitors the effects of the global financial and economic crisis on the scope of Millennium 
Development goals. In 2008, the CEB and its High-level Committee on Programmes (HLCP) set up 
measures to review and analyse the impact of the crisis on most vulnerable groups. On this last issue, the 
CEB has devised special measures to facilitate a more rapid response from the United Nations system. 
Thus, 9 joint crisis initiatives were set up in the spring of 2009 with a multidimensional approach: (a) 
additional funding for the most vulnerable; (b) food safety; (c) trade; (d) green economic initiative; (e) a 
global employment pact; (f) social protection floors; (g) humanitarian action, social security and stabil-
ity; (h) technology and innovation and (i) control and analysis. 
24. Essentially, the CEB’s informal slogan is to achieve ‘a more coherent United Nations sys-
tem delivering as one in response to intergovernmental mandates at the global, regional and country 
levels’. To a considerable extent, their work takes as a reference the Secretary General’s quinquennial 
actions. For example, one of the centrepieces of these actions for the current five year period is to sup-
port member states in their efforts to advance economic growth, social development and environmental 
38 See A/RES/55/2, Millennium Declaration (8 September 2000).
39 See A/RES/67/226, Quadrennial comprehensive policy review of operational activities for development of the United 
Nations system (22 January 2013). 
40 E/2010/69, Annual overview report of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination for 2009/10, 
ECOSOC (7 May 2010).
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sustainability in an integrated manner. Thus, by extension, this agenda is also a priority for the CEB in 
its programme issue Strengthening United Nations system support for sustainable development: 
‘In response to General Assembly resolution 65/152”, CEB (under the aegis of its High-level Com-
mittee on Programmes) developed several joint contributions of the United Nations system to the prepara-
tory process of the Conference on Sustainable Development aimed at advancing coherence and synergies 
within the United Nations system on sustainable development’.41
25. In this regard, the CEB works to ensure a coordinated approach of the United Nations to 
follow–up of the Millennium Summit from 2000. A decade later, in 2012, this body was explaining its 
functions regarding the Millennium goals in the following manner: 
‘Acting on its mandate to enhance United Nations system coordination and coherence in support 
of and conformity with intergovernmental mandates, CEB bolstered its efforts to support countries in the 
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and strengthened United Nations system collabora-
tion around sustainable development issues’.42
26. As a result, for example, the HLCP addresses strategic matters with a view to speeding 
up implementation of the Millennium goals for 2015. Furthermore, this body in April 2012 drew up a 
synthesis Report entitled “Fairer, Greener, more Sustainable Globalization” which highlights the co-
ordination problems in this specific area.43 Not only does the HLCP refer directly to the problem of 
inter-institutional coordination as a structural issue which brings with it the imbalances in globalisation: 
‘Lack of policy coherence and not globalization per se, is a fundamental cause of the imbalances’;44 it 
also provides a somewhat caustic appraisal of the current situation:45 
‘There are many inter-governmental frameworks and international organizations within which glo-
bal issues are debated and policies formulated and implemented. In many respects, however, these institu-
tions tend to operate in “policy silos”, and there exists no effective mechanism for ensuring the integration 
of their work across institutional mandates—a major “structural gap”. Moreover, many lack effective 
mechanisms to encourage or enforce compliance—an “implementation gap’.46
27. One structural problem for inter-institutional cooperation, which also provides the stimulus 
for growing fragmentation of global governance and international law, are the functioning of treaty-based 
regimes as a form of policy silos. The resulting challenge is captured by Koskenniemi with great clarity: 
‘As [...] international rationalities clash, there no longer is any neutral terrain on which to resolve 
such conflicts. The battle is waged through jurisdictional language: you tell me which institution is char-
ged to deal with such clashes, and I will tell you how it will be resolved, which preference will win out’.47
28. For reasons such as this, many United Nations officials and public representatives are dubi-
ous about the actual capacity of the UN to channel the positive effects and balance the negative effects 
of globalization. Logically, in any case, the HLCP sustains a rather different position: 
41 E/2012/67, Annual overview report of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination for 2011/12 
(3 May 2012), p.4.
42 E/2013/60, Annual overview report of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination for 2012 (3 
May 2013), conclusions, paragraph 73.
43 CEB/2012/4, CEB High-Level Committee on Programmes, Report of the High-Level Committee on Programmes (HLCP), 
at its Twenty-Third Session, WMO Headquarters, Geneva, 19-20 March 2012 (3 April 2012), Annex V “Fairer, Greener, more 
Sustainable Globalization”, A Synthesis Report by the High-Level Committee on Programmes (2 April 2012).
44 CEB/2012/4, op.cit, paragraph 38.
45 CEB/2012/4, op.cit, paragraph 46.
46 CEB/2012/4, op.cit, paragraph 55.
47 M. KosKennieMi, International Legislation: today’s limits, op.cit, p.32.
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‘The United Nations entities, acting collectively or individually, discharge of a range of functions 
that can influence the outcomes of the process of globalization—as the source of the human rights-based 
principles, norms and standards around which national policy should be articulated; as a source of re-
search, technical assistance and policy advice; and as a forum for the exchange of ideas and experiences’.48
29. In fact, the HLCP has publicly expressed its concern for the widespread scepticism regard-
ing the ability of the United Nations organizations to manage the phenomenon of globalization in a 
coherent manner:  
‘However, globalization has also affected the perception of the UN—there seems to be increasing 
scepticism about whether the UN as a multilateral framework can facilitate the urgent, cohesive and effec-
tive responses that today’s challenges demand. This doubt persists despite compelling evidence to the 
contrary, as well as evidence of the system’s capacity to reconfigure its operating organizations to elevate 
certain core objectives and enhance efficiency’. 
30. In this respect, the CEB experts are fully aware of the difficulty of their task. At the same 
time, in response to this disaffection, HLCP recalls some of the United Nations’ most important achieve-
ments –in particular the Universal Declaration, the Convention on the rights of the Child , the ILO agree-
ments, the Millennium Goals and the intergovernmental panel on climate change– and refers to them as 
essential for achieving better outcomes from the globalization process. 
31. However, the actual problem resulting from the current multi-layered overlapping of authori-
ties within the UN universe is also inevitably expressed within the coordination structures themselves. As 
explained, according to the Charter, the ECOSOC is authorized to coordinate within UN and paradoxi-
cally, therefore, to also “coordinate” the tasks of the CEB today.49 In this regard, the General Assembly 
has also formally attributed the function of providing coordination and guidance to ECOSOC in order to 
ensure that political orientations ‘are implemented on a system-wide basis’;50 a paradoxical policy meas-
ure when the CEB has the recently been given the wherewithal to coordinate high level inter-institutional 
coordination (HLCP, etc). Unquestionably, this super-structure for coordinating coordination (sic) weak-
ens the authority of the CEB in fulfilling its mandate on coherence. In other words, the executive directors 
that make up the CEB are subject to the regular control of one of the specialized agencies of the UN. To 
a certain extent, this phenomenon is illustrative of the long ongoing struggle for power/authority between 
the organizational units that make up the United Nations. Inevitably, this situation contrasts markedly 
with the CEB’s new task in Coordination in preparation and follow up of UN conferences and summits 
within the framework of its functions of ensuring system-wide coherence on programme issues: 
‘Responding to calls by the General Assembly for system-wide coordination in the preparation and 
follow-up to United Nations conferences and summits, CEB through its subsidiary machinery, consis-
tently develops joint contributions as inputs to those meetings and systematically promotes collaboration 
and coherence in follow-up actions by the United Nations system’.51
32. In practice, the UN universe tends to regularly develop new layers of authority over its many 
bodies, including the CEB itself, and in doing so increases the latter’s Herculean task of delivering ef-
fective inter-agency coordination. An additional notable example in this regard is the so-called Com-
prehensive Policy Review of operational activities for the development of the United Nations system. 
This policy review mechanism created by a General Assembly Resolution serves as an instrument for 
the monitoring and the assessment of all UN development operations. Under this policy review scheme 
based on quadrennial reviews —where ECOSOC also provides coordination and guidance to ensure that 
48 CEB/2012/4, op.cit, paragraph 54.
49 On so-called ‘co-ordinocrats’ see F. MeZZalaMa, K. issaotHMan & l. ouedraogo, Review of the Administrative 
Committee on Co-ordination and its Machinery, Joint Inspection Unit, Geneva, JIU/REP99/1 (1999), p.14. 
50 See A/RES/67/226, Quadrennial comprehensive policy review (2012).
51 E/2013/60, Annual overview report of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination for 2012 (3 
May 2013), paragraph 55.
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those policies are implemented—, new system-wide policy orientation for the development, cooperation 
and country-level modalities have been established... 
33. Last but not least, all these multiple old and new pro-coordination within UN are adminis-
tered under the watchful eye of governments, to whom ultimately the CEB is answerable. As a result, 
all the annual reports of the CEB clearly capture this complicated position synthesized in the following 
catch phrase which, with minor variations, generally appears in its annual reports: ‘CEB deepen[s] its ef-
forts to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations system by fostering coherence and coordination 
in response to mandates by Member States’.52 In short, the CEB´s capacity to promote world policy co-
herence and coordination in general is inevitably limited by the traditional organizational forces which 
have driven the complex UN universe since its inception. 
IV. Current policy options
34. The challenge of coherence in the architecture of global governance within the UN goes far 
beyond the CEB. Essentially, it is a structural challenge which dates from way back, transcending the 
creation of the United Nations. When the post-World War II system of international organizations was 
created, it was deliberately designed by its founders to be decentralized;53 different international institu-
tions were built upon and governed by their national counterparts— be they foreign ministries, treasur-
ies, or departments of agriculture, health, education, and labour. As Ruggie underlines: 
‘The most distinctive institutional feature of the UN system, therefore, is that it is not designed as a 
matrix at all but as a set of deeply rooted columns connected only by thin and tenuous rows. Nothing that 
has transpired since 1945 has transformed that fundamental reality’.54
35. Hence, preserving the sense of unified purpose within the system is not the competence of 
the CEB but of the governments that make up the United Nations. Nevertheless, the CEB can make 
some contributions to improving policy coherence in accordance with its formal authority to guide pro-
grammes, activities and proposals. As a result, since 2003, the CEB has taken some steps to guide and in-
fluence programmes and activities as well as urgent political initiatives. In this regard, this peculiar body 
in the heart of the United Nations system, with the Secretary General presiding as primus inter pares, has 
several advantages for promoting a paradigm change. The basic issue is how to increase interdependence 
of the independent mandates. For this purpose, joint collaboration initiatives have proliferated in recent 
years,55 and the CEB also has the capacity to promote high level activities and best practices in coordina-
tion matters;56 and understandably, its members and technical teams have for years been among the most 
active advocates of the need to build “bridges” between the concurrent mandates of UN agencies.57
36. The high level representation in CEB −Executive Directors of international organizations− 
as well as the fact that CEB’s Secretariat responds solely to the UN Secretary General −as president of 
the CEB− offers some possibilities for successfully promoting some good practices in the field of inter-
institutional coordination within the United Nations. In this respect, for example, the CEB could easily 
promote some good practices with the help of the international Law Commission. (ILC). As the latter 
body is competent in codification and progressive development of international law, it  would be reason-
able to explore, together with the CEB, best legal practices in inter-institutional cooperation, with a view 
52 E/2013/60, Annual, op.cit., p.3.
53 J. W. HolMes, The Shaping of Peace (University of Toronto Press 1979).
54 J. ruggie, ‘The United Nations and Globalization: Patterns and Limits of Institutional Adaptation’, 3 Global Governance 
9 (2003): 303.
55 P. laMy, Pragmatic solutions need to be found now to enhance global governance, WTO (2010).
56 J. ruggie, ‘The United Nations and Globalization: Patterns and Limits of Institutional Adaptation’, 3 Global Governance 
9 (2003): 301-321.
57 See Economic and Social Council Hears Briefing on Results of lnitial Session of Administrative Committee on 
Coordination, Press Release ECOSOC/5890 (12 May 2000). 
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to creating new effective legal tools on this issue in the long term4. Legal and policy measures such as, 
among others, reciprocal technical assistance, attribution of relevance to legal and fact determinations 
from other regimes (inter-institutional deference) and the creation of effective inter-institutional dispute 
settlement mechanisms, as well as joint decision making bodies are basic examples in this regard. 
37. Article 13.1(a) of the United Nations Charter mandates the General Assembly to promote 
and commission studies for codifying and progressive development of international law. Since Resolu-
tion 174 of 21 November 1947 created the ILC, progressive development of international law consists 
of drawing up draft agreements on unregulated matters, or insufficiently regulated (article 15 of the 
Statute). Reasonably, inter-institutional coordination and coherence is one such case. The problem was 
identified many years ago; as Morgenstern explained in the nineteen seventies: 
‘There would seem to be a need for a much wider awareness of the need for coherence in interna-
tional legislation if the international law of the future is not to be cluttered, like space, with imperfect 
technology of the twentieth century’.58
38. On this point, initiatives should exceed the diagnoses currently available on fragmentation 
of global governance and focus on practical proposals. In fact, although the appropriate framework for 
these issues of lege ferenda is the long term work programme of the ILC, it is clear that results can be 
obtained in the short term with the political will of some governments (i.e: G20). For several years now 
the high-level representatives of the United Nations, the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO have 
sat at the table in the CEB’s biennial meetings. Unquestionably, it is the first global body in history in 
which the San Francisco regime (UN and its specialized agencies) and the Bretton Woods system (IMF 
and World Bank), together with the WTO, regularly participate in a common body partly aimed at im-
proving the coherence of their diverse policies.  
39. Nevertheless, these international organizations are largely tied to the mast of their respec-
tive treaty mandates. In this sense and notwithstanding that the CEB seats are occupied by the Direc-
tors General, those who actually make the global policy decisions in practice are the domestic agencies 
participating in these specialized organizations. For Müller, in this regard, ‘consolidation and merging 
of mandates and structures appear to be a precondition for coherent and efficient action’, which would 
require ‘a fundamental restructuring of the UN system, and that would face tremendous barriers’. There-
fore, incremental consolidation, restricted to a limited number of entities and focusing on a narrow 
subject area, appears to be a more workable solution.59
40. However, it is important to remember that the most powerful specialized agencies are not 
interested in building bridges in this respect, because this would restrict their leverage when defining 
global policies. In this context, and to paraphrase MacLaren, ‘as long as the barons have their own con-
stitutional legitimacy, policy coordination of their work is impossible’.60 In fact, when the Kofi Annan, 
Secretary General of the United Nations began to set up his plan for improving the UN system at the 
close of the nineties, not many supported his 1997 proposal that they convene a ministerial commission 
to review the association agreements between the UN and the specialized agencies, with an eye to better 
integrating the UN’s capacity to operate globally in all policy areas.61 
41. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that the CEB lacks the capacity to lead major global 
transformations regarding the coherence of international law and policies. To quote Ruggie:
58 F. Morgenstern, ‘International Legislation at the Crossroads’, 49 British Yearbook of International law (1978): 117.
59 See J. Müller, Reforming the United Nations: the challenge of working together, Ed. Joachim Müller  (MartinusNijhoff 
2010), p.X.
60 See r. Mclaren, ‘The UN System and its Quixotic Quest for Coordination’, 34 International Organization1 (1980): 
146-147 y r. Mclaren, ‘UN reform through coordination by the ACC: the continuing saga of the king and the barons’, 67 
International Review of Administrative Sciences 2 (2001):320.
61 See UN Doc. A/51/950, Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform (14 July 1997), paragraph 89.
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‘The ACC/CEB, which the heads of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and 
the WTO now attend, was never intended to modify this constitutional arrangement. Throughout its his-
tory it has discussed but was unable meaningfully to coordinate what was, in any case, merely the secre-
tariat tail end of the UN system’s policy processes’.
42. According to this expert, an appeal to the greater social good is of limited use in persuading 
agencies within the same government to collaborate, let alone the international organizations of which 
their states are members. This is not because they are run by bad people but because of the structure 
of incentives and accountability under which these functional agencies operate: achieving increased 
instances of inter-agency collaboration requires finding some way of overcoming these structural flaws. 
Thus, as Ruggie suggests, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the UN truly straddles an epochal 
divide, one side anchored firmly in the twentieth-century intergovernmental order, while the other is 
making efforts to create and participate in a more inclusive and more fluid global public domain.
43. In this context, the ways in which CEB relates to new global policy forums such as G20 is 
of significant interest. The G20 certainly has an increasing capacity to generate policy space and mo-
mentum across the board of the networking architecture of global governance. In practice, participating 
in G20 meetings and summits often helps the heads of international organizations to obtain the political 
impetus needed to push through their agendas;62 as Lamy puts it, ‘[the G20] is not a world government, 
but it gives signals, impulses’.63 Thus, as a result, the UN Secretary General (CEB president) and the 
heads of several international organizations already participate in some G20 meetings, and they are 
pushing to increase their presence; also interestingly, international organizations already contribute to 
G20 debates through joint reports specially prepared for their meetings.64
44. Not surprisingly, pragmatic observers view the G20 as the natural home of global leadership 
on one hand, and international organizations as places of expertise, mobilization of resources and spe-
cialized inputs (e.g. rules, policies, programs) on the other.65 However, it is hard to disagree with those 
critics who portray the G20 as a discriminatory elite club with its non-inclusive global policymaking. 
In addition, it is obvious that neither the CEB president nor the heads of international organizations 
participating in G20 meetings are significant key actors deciding policy direction in this type of forum. 
45. Reasonably, the conundrum of how to improve global policy coherence is that of finding a 
way to lead global governance in an effective and inclusive manner. In fact, it is not clear how and who 
should lead such an objective in the making: the governments, international organizations, parliaments, 
combinations or groups comprising all of these?66 In this scenario of network governance and polyar-
chies, the limitations facing the CEB in carrying out its work are clear. Certainly, issues of on global 
policy coherence are more seriously taken into consideration nowadays. However, the bits and pieces of 
a new architecture for global governance are certainly not developing ‘à la Montesquieu’, as Lamy puts 
it: things are being done more in networking and informal modes, and some mechanisms are progres-
sively being put in place to promote coherence.67 In this context, the CEB could definitely play a role, 
collaborating with other policy actors in promoting some improvements in inter-institutional coordina-
tion. However, coherence in both internal and international policymaking will continue to be a domestic 
policy issue first and foremost, and only from the domestic sphere can it extend upwards towards the 
global realm, at least at the present time. In short, the CEB may well try to do its utmost, but coherence 
still starts at home. 
62 P. laMy, Pragmatic solutions need to be found now to enhance global governance, WTO (2010).
63 P. laMy, Lamy urges raising UN ECOSOC profile, WTO (2011).
64 For first examples see Seizing the benefits of Trade for Employment and Growth, OECD-WB and ILO and Prize Volatility 
in Food and Agricultural Markets, OECD-FAO-UCTAD-WB-WFP.
65 P. laMy, Crisis is opportunity to restore coherence in global economic governance, WTO (2010).
66 P. laMy, Lamy sees need for “right global governance”, WTO (2009).
67 P. laMy, Pragmatic solutions need to be found now to enhance global governance, WTO (2010).
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